Thresholds in Ethics
Issues to do with thresholds arise in many different areas of moral philosophy. Nonetheless, there is a striking lack of a general, unified, and systematic treatment of thresholds in ethics. In this project, we shall provide such a treatment. Our point of departure is a certain suspicion. While appeals to thresholds in ethics often have common sense and intuition on their side, they are often accused of being arbitrary and unprincipled. We aim to show that this dismissive attitude is unjustified in a number of different fields. One example is cases of collective action, where it is often assumed that one individual’s action makes no difference. We will argue against this assumption by showing that many individual actions in fact cause a threshold to be crossed. Another field is theories of welfare and our obligations to future generations, where we will argue that, contrary to popular belief, appeal to non-arbitrary thresholds can solve several persistent issues. Yet another example is satisficing consequentialism, according to which an action is permissible if its outcome is “good enough”. The most common objection to this view is that it is impossible to locate a non-arbitrary threshold for permissibility. We will argue, however, that such a non-arbitrary threshold can be identified. The expected result of the project is thus that thresholds in ethics are much more defensible than their poor reputation suggests; in fact they can solve a number of resilient ethical problems.
Final report
Scientific final report on RJ Project P21-0462, “Thresholds in Ethics”
Purpose and development
Issues to do with thresholds arise in many different areas of moral philosophy. In spite of this fact, there has been a striking lack of a more general and systematic treatment of thresholds in ethics. The aim of this project has been to provide such a treatment. The project description focused on (i) so-called “collective impact cases”, (ii) theories of welfare and future generations, and (iii) other areas. As regards subfield (iii), the project’s main focus has been on thresholds in philosophical accounts of harm and benefit, and of moral responsibility. This subfield has proved to be even more fruitful than we initially expected.
Implementation
The project has been characterized by close cooperation between the project members. As can be seen from the list of publications, many articles have been co-authored by two or in some cases all three of the project members. A number of articles are also co-authored with other researchers at the Department of Philosophy in Uppsala. A goal has been to predominantly publish the project’s research results in highly regarded international journals with peer review. At present the project has generated 14 such publications. This number can be expected to increase further, since a number of articles are at present under review or in progress. A few articles have been published in international anthologies.
Most important results
Below, we describe one result per subfield.
Collective impact cases: The project description sketched an argument for the conclusion that at least some individual actions have to affect the outcome, as regards welfare, in “Drops of Water” and structurally similar cases. This argument has now been developed in detail. In addition, we have formulated two new arguments, which in different respects are improvements on the first argument. In one of the new arguments, the premise stating that the relation contains less suffering than is transitive, is replaced by a premise, “Permutation”, to the effect that if two outcomes differ only concerning which individual occupies which welfare level, then the two outcomes contain the same total amount of welfare. We claim that this premise is very plausible in itself, besides making the argument immune to objections that have been raised against various transitivity principles. The second new argument does not presuppose the Pareto principle mentioned in the project description. Instead, the argument relies exclusively on the assumption that the relation contains less suffering than is acyclic among individuals. This assumption is accepted by almost all philosophers working in the area. Further, we show that the assumption follows from a variant of Permutation, in conjunction with a logically weaker Pareto principle, stating that if all affected persons are better off in outcome X than in outcome Y, then the total amount of welfare is greater in X than in Y.
Theories of welfare and future generations: Perhaps the most important result within this part of the project is a proof for the conclusion that all population axiologies which satisfy some simple and plausible axioms can be represented by an additive ratio scale function. Since the axioms in question are compatible with lexical orderings of welfare levels, this proof is an important step in the argument for a lexicographic population axiology, sketched in the project description. Some mathematical details in the formal proof are still to be completed.
Other areas: A simple and popular account of harm and benefit claims that an event harms (benefits) a person if and only if she would have been better (worse) off, had the event not occurred. This account, often called “CCA”, thus locates the threshold between harm and benefit at the welfare level the person would have occupied if the event had not occurred. In the project, we have developed several new arguments against CCA, and criticized suggested replies to well-known objections against the account. We have also criticized attempts to defend and supplement CCA by appealing to “plural” harm; that is, the idea that several events together may harm a person, even if no singular event harms her. Furthermore, alternative accounts to CCA, such as “the Negative Impact on Well-Being Account” (NIWA), have been developed in the project.
New research questions
Below, one question per subfield is described.
Collective impact cases: We claim to have provided strong arguments for the conclusion that the relation has equally high welfare as is transitive in collective impact cases. This raises the important and overlooked question which further conditions must be satisfied in order to allow us to infer that every individual action makes a welfare-relevant difference.
Theories of welfare and future generations: Given that the only population axiologies that avoid a number of much discussed impossibility theorems are ones which assume a lexical ranking of welfare levels, and that such axiologies can be given a simple additive representation, the question arises whether there nevertheless are good reasons to deny additivity. Additive theories have several features that most population ethicists find attractive, e.g., “separability”. Moreover, the standard argument against additive theories, namely that they imply the “repugnant conclusion”, does not apply to lexical additive theories. An important question is hence whether there are other weighty reasons against accepting additivity.
Other areas: As mentioned above, several CCA adherents have tried to defend and supplement this account by suggesting accounts of plural harm. We believe that plural harm is an important phenomenon, but we do not find the rather few accounts that have been suggested convincing. A topic for future research, already started on in the project, is therefore to develop a more plausible account.
Dissemination and collaboration
The fact that the project’s research results to a great extent are published under open access in highly regarded international journals ensures that they will be widely disseminated within the research community. Many of the published articles have already been quoted and discussed by leading researchers in the field. Several prominent researchers have also presented their work at the Uppsala Philosophy Department’s research seminar in practical philosophy. Among them are Jacob Nebel (NYU), Julia Nefsky (Toronto), Elliott Thornley (Oxford), Travis Timmerman (Seton Hall), and Patrick Todd (Edinburgh/Lund). Of relevance regarding international collaboration is also that two of the project members, Erik Carlson and Jens Johansson, together with their Uppsala colleague Olle Risberg, are the editors of Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Harm, to be published by Oxford University Press during 2026. This volume contains contributions from more than 20 prominent researchers.
Purpose and development
Issues to do with thresholds arise in many different areas of moral philosophy. In spite of this fact, there has been a striking lack of a more general and systematic treatment of thresholds in ethics. The aim of this project has been to provide such a treatment. The project description focused on (i) so-called “collective impact cases”, (ii) theories of welfare and future generations, and (iii) other areas. As regards subfield (iii), the project’s main focus has been on thresholds in philosophical accounts of harm and benefit, and of moral responsibility. This subfield has proved to be even more fruitful than we initially expected.
Implementation
The project has been characterized by close cooperation between the project members. As can be seen from the list of publications, many articles have been co-authored by two or in some cases all three of the project members. A number of articles are also co-authored with other researchers at the Department of Philosophy in Uppsala. A goal has been to predominantly publish the project’s research results in highly regarded international journals with peer review. At present the project has generated 14 such publications. This number can be expected to increase further, since a number of articles are at present under review or in progress. A few articles have been published in international anthologies.
Most important results
Below, we describe one result per subfield.
Collective impact cases: The project description sketched an argument for the conclusion that at least some individual actions have to affect the outcome, as regards welfare, in “Drops of Water” and structurally similar cases. This argument has now been developed in detail. In addition, we have formulated two new arguments, which in different respects are improvements on the first argument. In one of the new arguments, the premise stating that the relation contains less suffering than is transitive, is replaced by a premise, “Permutation”, to the effect that if two outcomes differ only concerning which individual occupies which welfare level, then the two outcomes contain the same total amount of welfare. We claim that this premise is very plausible in itself, besides making the argument immune to objections that have been raised against various transitivity principles. The second new argument does not presuppose the Pareto principle mentioned in the project description. Instead, the argument relies exclusively on the assumption that the relation contains less suffering than is acyclic among individuals. This assumption is accepted by almost all philosophers working in the area. Further, we show that the assumption follows from a variant of Permutation, in conjunction with a logically weaker Pareto principle, stating that if all affected persons are better off in outcome X than in outcome Y, then the total amount of welfare is greater in X than in Y.
Theories of welfare and future generations: Perhaps the most important result within this part of the project is a proof for the conclusion that all population axiologies which satisfy some simple and plausible axioms can be represented by an additive ratio scale function. Since the axioms in question are compatible with lexical orderings of welfare levels, this proof is an important step in the argument for a lexicographic population axiology, sketched in the project description. Some mathematical details in the formal proof are still to be completed.
Other areas: A simple and popular account of harm and benefit claims that an event harms (benefits) a person if and only if she would have been better (worse) off, had the event not occurred. This account, often called “CCA”, thus locates the threshold between harm and benefit at the welfare level the person would have occupied if the event had not occurred. In the project, we have developed several new arguments against CCA, and criticized suggested replies to well-known objections against the account. We have also criticized attempts to defend and supplement CCA by appealing to “plural” harm; that is, the idea that several events together may harm a person, even if no singular event harms her. Furthermore, alternative accounts to CCA, such as “the Negative Impact on Well-Being Account” (NIWA), have been developed in the project.
New research questions
Below, one question per subfield is described.
Collective impact cases: We claim to have provided strong arguments for the conclusion that the relation has equally high welfare as is transitive in collective impact cases. This raises the important and overlooked question which further conditions must be satisfied in order to allow us to infer that every individual action makes a welfare-relevant difference.
Theories of welfare and future generations: Given that the only population axiologies that avoid a number of much discussed impossibility theorems are ones which assume a lexical ranking of welfare levels, and that such axiologies can be given a simple additive representation, the question arises whether there nevertheless are good reasons to deny additivity. Additive theories have several features that most population ethicists find attractive, e.g., “separability”. Moreover, the standard argument against additive theories, namely that they imply the “repugnant conclusion”, does not apply to lexical additive theories. An important question is hence whether there are other weighty reasons against accepting additivity.
Other areas: As mentioned above, several CCA adherents have tried to defend and supplement this account by suggesting accounts of plural harm. We believe that plural harm is an important phenomenon, but we do not find the rather few accounts that have been suggested convincing. A topic for future research, already started on in the project, is therefore to develop a more plausible account.
Dissemination and collaboration
The fact that the project’s research results to a great extent are published under open access in highly regarded international journals ensures that they will be widely disseminated within the research community. Many of the published articles have already been quoted and discussed by leading researchers in the field. Several prominent researchers have also presented their work at the Uppsala Philosophy Department’s research seminar in practical philosophy. Among them are Jacob Nebel (NYU), Julia Nefsky (Toronto), Elliott Thornley (Oxford), Travis Timmerman (Seton Hall), and Patrick Todd (Edinburgh/Lund). Of relevance regarding international collaboration is also that two of the project members, Erik Carlson and Jens Johansson, together with their Uppsala colleague Olle Risberg, are the editors of Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Harm, to be published by Oxford University Press during 2026. This volume contains contributions from more than 20 prominent researchers.