An Epistemic Approach to the Justification of Public Coercion: Increasing the legitimacy by strengthening the argument quality
In order for a liberal-democratic society to function, the state needs to exercise public coercion vis-à-vis its citizens by enforcing laws or other rules. But as such coercion will result in limitations of the freedom of citizens who object to such coercion, the coercion needs to be justified. The overarching aim of this project is to address how this should be done. The dominant position among political theorists and philosophers today is that public coercion only can be justified interpersonally, which means that the permissibility of coercion is determined by the relationship between the reasons used in the justification and the views of those who are being coerced. While that can be seen as an adequate accommodation for radical disagreements in politics, this approach is less receptive to concerns about how to achieve good quality of justification. This can be called the epistemic quality of justification and it is s determined by impersonal rather than interpersonal criteria – i.e., by factors, such as truth and soundness. By drawing on argumentation theory, the following two research questions will be addressed: What is the most plausible version of an epistemic approach to justifications of political coercion? What is normatively gained and lost by prioritizing the quality of the justification rather than the interpersonal aspect of the justification? A wide-reflective equilibrium-style analysis will be used in the project, which will result in a book.
Final report
The overarching aim with this project is to address the question about on what grounds the exercise of political power is legitimate. One possible and rather obvious answer is that the exercise of political power is legitimate if it can be seen as the realization of the will of the people. However, in this project I have explored a different view which constitutes a reason-based – rather than will-based – conception of political legitimacy. According to such a reason-based conception of political legitimacy, the primary source of legitimacy is not related to the will of the people but rather to the rightness of political actions – something which in turn is determined by reasons and discovered by deliberation. As the rightness of political actions is determined by morality, this conception of political legitimacy is not only reason-based, but more specifically also moralized
This reason-based view of political legitimacy has subsequently been explored in various ways in the project. First, the conditions for moral legitimacy have been examined. More specifically, I have explored whether these conditions should be understood as objective or subjective—that is, whether political legitimacy is determined by what is in fact right and wrong, or by what we perceive to be objectively right and wrong. In this regard, I have defended an objective view of political legitimacy. I have also investigated how, as citizens, we can practically proceed in order to arrive at political decisions that are legitimate. In this context, I emphasize the importance of deliberation as a means of reaching politically legitimate decisions.
This reason-based view of political legitimacy has subsequently been explored in various ways in the project. First, the conditions for moral legitimacy have been examined. More specifically, I have explored whether these conditions should be understood as objective or subjective—that is, whether political legitimacy is determined by what is in fact right and wrong, or by what we perceive to be objectively right and wrong. In this regard, I have defended an objective view of political legitimacy. I have also investigated how, as citizens, we can practically proceed in order to arrive at political decisions that are legitimate. In this context, I emphasize the importance of deliberation as a means of reaching politically legitimate decisions.