Thin constitutionalism is a position in the debate on the most basic constitutional questions. Adherents of this view argue that democracy builds the strongest foundation for itself if, in the least degree possible, the laws it enacts have a constitutional character: that is, if only the most basic political rules--those guaranteeing political freedom and establishing procedures for decision-making--are constitutionalised and thus made difficult to change. Substantive policies, by contrast, should be decided in the greatest possible degree through the standard political methods. If responsibility for the basic direction of policy clearly lies with the majority, then popular government will be able to act decisively and thereby to win respect. The practical effect, argues the thin constitutionalist, of constitutionalising controversial policies of a substantive nature is to exacerbate the widespread lack of confidence in democracy's ability to process conflicting goals constructively, and to adjudicate between opposed interests and ideas.

This view has enjoyed particularly strong backing in Scandinavian politics and political science, especially during the three decades after World War II. Democracy, according to this argument, strengthens confidence in its survival most effectively if virtually all substantive policies are open to determination by majority rule. Neither the welfare state nor the market economy nor a given security policy should be set in constitutional stone. If our aim is to pull out the rug from under democracy's adversaries, the thin constitutionalist contends, it is counterproductive to be so fearful of the people as to grant constitutional privilege to any particular political viewpoint.

Thick constitutionalism is the opposite position. Rejecting the claims above, advocates of this arrangement argue that nothing less than built-in safeguards against majority rule will suffice if belief in democracy is to be self-reinforcing. History has shown, namely, that friends of constitutional government have reason to fear what elected leaders backed by popular opinion might bring about. It is crucial, therefore, that such policy substance as may be deemed critical for democracy's survival be constitutionally privileged.
In cultural terms, this may involve some form of state church. Administratively, it may entail special rights for universities, central banks, public agencies, constituent provinces, or the like. In general political terms, it may be a matter of ensuring that the legal foundations for certain critical policy choices--for a market economy or a welfare state, say--are immunised against the possibility that contrary legislation will be enacted based on a simple majority constituted on a single occasion.

During the first decades after World War II in Scandinavia, the prevailing constitutional viewpoint was different from that on the Continent. The usual Nordic conception was that democracy operating on its own--"self-monitored, so to speak--could best ensure the conditions for its own survival. On the Continent, by contrast, leaders sought to safeguard representative government through judicial review, independent central banks, bans on certain parties, over-representation for certain sectors, and the establishment of a European union. The point of thinking in terms of a protective wall was to build it in such a fashion as to immunise the political system against the influence of majority views. To the least extent possible would central policy choices risk being subjected to public opinion.

Neoliberalism, which gained ground across Europe beginning around 1980, pushed developments in the same direction. Its theories supported and reinforced the picture of the people and their elected representatives as the problem rather than the solution to the need to process conflicting goals and to adjudicate opposing interests. The defense of democracy was considered--contrary to the precepts of thin constitutionalism--to require more in the way of expert rule and less in the way of vulnerability to public opinion.
Over the course of time, the neoliberal offensive has forced thin constitutionalism into retreat. The "fear of the people" now sooner unites than divides constitutional thinking in Scandinavia and on the Continent. This is true not least in connection with the consequences of the financial crisis after 2008. The crisis of the Union project has contributed to a pronounced convergence of conceptions on constitutional questions across the whole of Europe. How much of the political agenda should be open to majority rule if the effectiveness of democracy's self-defense is assumed to be the basic constitutional problem? Constitutional framers the world over confront the same question.

Within the framework of the project, the question of the constitutional requirements for democratic self-defense has been the subject of close examination. Three key findings in particular figure in the publications. The first bears on the tension between political and economic liberalism in any national configuration characterised by social reformism, a mixed economy, and a welfare state. The second concerns the difference between interpreting political divisions horizontally (as a matter of political versus economic liberalism) and interpreting them vertically (as a matter of accommodation versus recalcitrance in the balance between national and international decision-making). The third important finding relates to what is needed to establish and maintain a reasonable degree of confidence along the vertical dimension. The claim here is that the market-liberal idea of freedom of movement should not be interpreted as entailing the standardisation of social organisation across different countries, but rather as entailing non-discrimination between operators based in different national contexts. As the list of publications makes clear, considerable emphasis has been placed on elucidating these three different aspects of the problem for that portion of the Swedish public with a particular interest in these matters.

The next stage in the work--which is now underway and which lies outside the allotted project time--is to answer the question at hand in a pointed and integrated manner. Under what conditions can either of the two principles of thin and thick constitutionalism be deemed most appropriate, if democracy's self-defence is assumed to be the ultimate purpose? The answer is suitably sought, the project leader has concluded, in the form of an historical comparison between Swedish and European ways of conceiving the problem.

The publishing strategy for the project has been to prepare essays in both Swedish and English, with an eye to reaching successively greater clarity on the theoretical import and empirical applicability of the three conceptual dichotomies adumbrated above. The majority of these essays and book chapters were published in the spring of 2014, in a volume entitled Akademisk, politisk och ekonomisk liberalism [Academic, political, and economic liberalism]. The most important English essay appeared in Democratic politics in a European Union under stress, a volume published in the autumn of 2014. The project leader now plans to present a summary of what sets Swedish and European ways of conceptualising these issues apart, with thin and thick constitutionalism offering the basic choices.

The project leader himself considers the most promising of these publications to be Delegation eller blandad författning? [Delegation or mixed government?] (2013), Demokratins självförsvar efter finanskrisen [Democratic self-defence after the financial crisis] (2014) and The need for legitimate opposition and protectionism (2014).

The project leader is the author, finally, of two publications aimed at a larger public than the academic community narrowly conceived. The first, commissioned by Svenska institutet för Europapolitiska studier, is an overview of the research entitled Förtroendet för det europeiska unionsprojektet [The prerequisites for trust in the European Union project] (2013). The second, commissioned by Forum för EU-debatt, is a small book entitled Unionens demokratiska underskott [The democratic deficit in the European Union] (2014). The project leader has also been a frequent commentator in newspapers and on the radio on Swedish and European constitutional questions.

Publications

2009

Yttrandefriheten och statsskicket [Freedom of expression in the Swedish form of government]
pp. 91–102 in A.R. Olsson, ed., Till tryckfrihetens försvar. Lund: Studentlitteratur.

Reformismens fortsatta möjlighet [The feasibility of further reformism]
pp. 13–36 in B. Ruthström, red. Spaning Europa. Stockholm: Premiss

Putting limits on accountability avoidance
pp. 35–50 in S. Gustavsson, C. Karlsson & T. Persson, eds., The Illusion of accountability in the European Union. London: Routledge.

Varför blandad författning? [Why thick constitutionalism]
pp. 36–50 in M. Anthonsen & S. C. Jagers, red., Rätt grönt. Vänbok till professor Lennart J. Lundqvist. Göteborg: University of Gothenburg (= Göteborg Studies in Politics, 120).

2010

European transnational constitutionalism: end of History, or a role for legitimate opposition?
pp. 211–22 in E. Özdalga & S. Persson, eds., Contested sovereignties: government and democracy in European and Middle Eastern perspectives. London: I.B. Tauris, 2010 (= Swedish Research Institute in Istanbul, 19).

Thick and thin constitutionalism
Statsvetenskaplig tidskrift, 112 (1): 56–59.

Anmälan av Karin Olsson: Den (över)levande demokratin. En idékritisk analys av demokratins reproducerbarhet i Robert Dahls tänkta värld. Växjö University Press, 2009.
Statsvetenskaplig tidskrift, 112 (2): 255–263. [Book review of a dissertation by Karin Olsson on democracy’s self-reproduction according to Robert Dahl.]

Politisk och ekonomisk liberalism [Political and Economic Liberalism]
pp. 9–33 in T. Brunius, red., Forskning över gränserna (= Skrifter utgivna av Föreningen för filosofi och specialvetenskap, 17).

Akademisk liberalism [Academic liberalism]
Statsvetenskaplig tidskrift, 112 (4): 423–433.

2011

Myntunion utan fiskal union—hur är en sådan politiskt möjlig? [Monetary union without fiscal Union—what makes it politically possible?]
pp. 25–55 in U. Bernitz, L. Oxelheim & T. Persson, red., Överlever EMU utan fiskal union? Stockholm: Santérus.

Verklighetsnära statskunskap [Problem-driven political science research]
pp. 275–288 in C. G. Alvstam, B. Jännebring & D. Naurin, eds., I Europamissionens tjänst. En vänbok till Rutger Lindahl. Göteborg: Centrum för Europafrågor.

Unionsmedlemskapet som grundlagsproblem [EU membership in Swedish constitutional law]
Statsvetenskaplig tidskrift, 113 (3): 351–374.

2012

Olika syn på skilda uppfattningar [Different views on the fact of varied ideas and interests]
Svenska Dagbladet, 18 oktober.

EU balanserar på avgrundens rand The EU is balancing on the brink of disaster]
pp. 17–21 in Respons, number 6/2012.

2013

Delegation eller blandad författning? [Delegation or mixed government?]
pp. 109–125 in T. Bull, O. Lundin & E. Rynning, eds., Allmänt och enskilt—offentlig rätt i omvandling. Festskrift till Lena Marcusson. Uppsala: Iustus.

Förtroendet för det europeiska unionsprojektet [The prerequisites for trust in the European Union project]
Stockholm: Svenska institutet för Europapolitiska studier (= Europapolitisk analys 2013:9) [12 pages].

Intertwined sovereignties and the problem of legitimate opposition in the European Union
pp. 121–142 in P. Sevastik, ed., Aspects of sovereignty—Sino-Swedish reflections. Leiden: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers (= Raoul Wallenberg Institute Human Rights Library, 42).

2014

Normprövning av unionsrätten [When does Swedish constitutional law trump EU law?]
pp. 395–406 in Svea Hovrätt 400 år. Stockholm: Norstedts.

Unionens demokratiska underskott [The democratic deficit in the European Union]
Stockholm: Forum för EU-debatt [48 pages].

Demokratins självförsvar efter finanskrisen [Democratic self-defence after the financial crisis]
pp. 276–291 in D. H.Claes, K. Heidar & C. Holst, eds., Politikk i grenseland—Festskrift til Øyvind Østerud. Oslo: Universitetsforlaget.

Rescuing democratic reformism in Europe after 2008
pp. 114–124 in T. Lundén, ed., Sweden-Serbia and Europe—periphery or not? Stockholm: Kungl. Vitterhets Historie och Antikvitetsakademien (= KVAA konferenser, 85).

Akademisk, politisk och ekonomisk liberalism [Academic, political, and economic liberalism]
Handlingar utgivna av Kungl. Vetenskapssamhället i Uppsala, 24 [371 pages].

The Need for Legitimate Opposition and Protectionism
pp. 236–254 in O. Cramme & S. B. Hobolt, eds., Democratic Politics in a European Union under Stress.
Oxford University Press.