Metaethics is the discipline that investigates the nature and status of ethics, focussing in particular on the semantics, epistemology, and psychology of moral judgement, and the ontology of moral properties. Some examples of core questions in metaethics are the following: Can moral judgements be true or false? Is there such a thing as moral knowledge and if so, how do we come by it? How are moral judgements connected to motivationally efficacious mental states? Are there moral properties and if so, what is their nature?
    The aim of this project was to revive an historically important contrast in meteathics, namely the one between rationalism and sentimentalism. According to the rationalists, moral judgement originates in a priori reflection, whereas according to the sentimentalists, moral judgement originates in sentiments. The project explored the debate between the rationalists and the sentimentalists in the early modern period, with a special focus on 18th century British philosophy.
    Rationalism and sentimentalism were the two dominant alternatives in eighteenth century moral philosophy and the issues that divided them are still unresolved. One aim of this project was to scrutinize the debate and present it as the dialectical exchange it in fact was. Two rationalists—Richard Price (1723-1791) and Thomas Reid (1710-1796)—and two sentimentalists—David Hume (1711-1776) and Adam Smith (1723-1790)—were the main objects of study.
    A second aim of the project was to assess the strength of rationalist and sentimentalist arguments. The project investigated whether and to what extent these arguments can advance the contemporary metaethical debate. In these ways, the project aimed to make contributions to the history of moral philosophy as well as to contemporary metaethics. As the project evolved, the emphasis on contemporary metaethics grew stronger, as is reflected in the list of publications. My contributions to contemporary metaethics are strongly related to the historical debate but one important caveat, emphasised in several publications related to the project, is that the metaethical questions of the 18th century are not quite the same as our metaethical questions in the present day. At the forefront of today’s debate are questions concerning moral concepts and semantic questions about the meaning of moral terms. Although these kinds of questions were anticipated by philosophers in the early modern period, they are largely preoccupied with epistemological questions concerning how we can come to know moral truths.
    The following three themes are among the project’s main upshots, which I develop in detail in several publications related to the project (see separate list of publications): (i) Some unduly neglected philosophers of the 18th century, in particular Richard Price, offered interesting arguments that in several ways anticipate debates in contemporary metaethics. Of special interest are his characterizations of moral properties and facts, his arguments concerning the necessity of fundamental moral truths, and his arguments concerning the connection between moral judgement and motivation to act. (ii) The distinction between rationalism and sentimentalism is sometimes misunderstood, or conflated with neighbouring distinctions, such as the one between cognitivism and non-cognitivism. This has repercussions for interpretations of the historical philosophers, in particular of Hume’s metaethics, as well as for the contemporary metaethical debate. For example, sentimentalist genealogies of moral judgement lend no direct support to non-cognitivism, neither as an interpretation of Hume’s view and nor as a contender in contemporary metathics. (iii) There is a neglected but historically notable middle way between rationalism and sentimentalism, developed by Franz Brentano (1838-1917). Brentano sought in various ways to preserve what he considered to be the merits of both Hume’s sentimentalism and Reid’s rationalism, but he also sought to remedy what he saw as shortcomings of the respective accounts.
    Two examples of new research questions that the project has generated are the following: (i) What are the implications of so-called ‘companions in guilt’ arguments in contemporary metaethics—a style of argument that was employed by, e.g., Price and Reid in the 18th century? How plausible are such arguments generally speaking? How plausible are the particular versions of this kind of argument, and what do they show? (ii) How plausible is Brentano’s aforementioned middle way between rationalism and sentimentalism. What can it contribute to contemporary metaethics, in which it is largely unknown?
    The project has involved a good deal of international engagements. I was one of two program coordinators and one of three local organizers of the 2015 edition of the annual International Hume Society Conference at Stockholm University. I have presented material related to the project at conferences and seminars at several universities, including Oxford (twice), Paris, Berlin, Umeå, Uppsala, Linköping, Stockholm, Cork, Groningen, Rome, Oslo, Stirling, Saarbrücken, and York.
    The results of the project have been communicated in articles in peer-reviewed journals and in edited volumes (see separate list of publications) and in contributions to workshops, conferences, and seminars. I have secured open access to all publications by uploading the accepted versions in the public digital research archive DiVA.
A spin-off effect of the project is that I have begun preparing a program application to RJ and other research funding bodies in collaboration with Gösta Grönroos and Henrik Lagerlund, who are both historians of philosophy at Stockholm University. The provisional program title is “Norms and Nature from Plato to Hume”. We have received funding from RJ for an initial workshop involving internationally prominent scholars in the history of philosophy. The workshop will take place at Stockholm University in May 2018 and we plan to submit the program application in early 2019.