The Foundations of Epistemic Normativity
Many of us think that we ought to believe in anthropogenic climate change, that our belief is justified given the evidence and that climate-change skepticism is not rationally permitted. These epistemological claims seem normative—concerning what we ought, are justified, or are permitted to believe. Epistemological normativity raises foundational questions concerning the semantics, metaphysics and epistemology of epistemology; questions that have traditionally been asked about normative moral claims, such as ‘murder is wrong’. Do epistemological claims represent how things are, or just express approval of policies? Are some of these claims true absolutely, or only relative to particular perspectives? If so, are there objective facts that make them true? Can we know them? Our aim is to defend Robust Realism, which gives an affirmative answer to each of the above questions. We take issue with a dominant trend towards anti-realism in the study of the foundations of epistemology, largely derived from the idea that epistemology is normative. While contributing to our understanding of the foundations of epistemic normativity, this project will be relevant to topical issues, such as the popular debunking of science and rampant disregard for facts and evidence in public debate. According to Robust Realism, climate scientists’ evidence objectively justifies belief in anthropogenic climate change, and there is an absolute distinction between real, well-founded news and propaganda. Project web site: https://sites.google.com/view/found-ep-norm/home
Final report
1 Purpose & Development
Epistemologists investigate norms of rationality and reasoning (how one ought to reason), as well as standards of justification (what one is permitted to believe given one’s evidence). They investigate fundamental epistemic values, such as knowledge and truth, and seek to articulate epistemic virtues, such as responsiveness to evidence. In everyday life, we make epistemological claims, such as that we ought to believe in anthropogenic climate change, that this belief is justified given the evidence and that climate-change skepticism is not rationally permitted. All this suggests that epistemology is normative—it has to do with norms, standards, obligations and permissions. This raises questions about the semantics, metaphysics and epistemology of epistemic norms.
The overarching aim of this project has been to address the following questions: Do epistemological statements represent how things are? Are there objective, epistemological facts? If there are, can we come to know them? In answering these questions, we have defended Robust Realism about epistemology. With regard to language and mind, we have argued that (a) epistemological statements are representational, (b) epistemological judgments are belief-like, and (c) some are true substantively and absolutely. With regard to metaphysics, we have argued that (d) there are objective epistemological properties and facts. And with regard to epistemology, we have argued that (e) it is possible to know these facts. The project has developed a new focus on these issues as they relate to logical norms.
2 Implementation
Joint work was undertaken concerning the epistemology and normativity of reasoning. This work relates to the psychological question of whether epistemic judgments are belief-like (i.e. answers (a) and (b)) and the epistemological question of how we know epistemic norms (i.e. answer (e). The second concerns issues to do with the knowledge norm of assertion.
Besson’s individual research focused on two issues to do with answers (a) and (b): first, that of offering a new account of the epistemology and normativity of logic, which is cognitivist. This is done through the following works: (1) (3), (6), (7) and (8). In particular, she argues in (1) and (7) that deductive reasoning is not rule following and that a proper epistemology for logic has to be ‘particular first’ and not based on grasp of general logical rules; she also explores the ramifications of this view for the normativity and psychology of deductive reasoning. The second issue concerns giving an account of knowing how, which in her view is a clear case of how epistemology ties in with norms, as she argues in (4); and in (5), she looks at the way knowing how can be used to articulate the nature of logical knowledge and the action-guiding character of logic.
Hattiangadi’s individual work has focussed on two issues to do with answers (a), (c) and (d): the first concerns (a) and (c). (19) contains a critical discussion of relativist and expressivist accounts of the semantics of logical disagreement; (13) contains a critical review of existing accounts and puts forward a positive view that is compatible with robust realism about logic. The latter is also developed in relation to normative disagreement more generally (26). The second concerns (d): (13) investigates the nature of epistemic normativity, and the implications for metaethics; (12) puts forth an argument against naturalism about epistemic and semantic norms that does not rely on the assumption that these norms are categorically prescriptive; and (15) defends the view that logic is not normative for reasoning.
Three conferences were organized: (i) Normativity and the A priori, held at Stockholm University in August 2018; (ii) Post Truth and the Objectivity of Epistemic Norms, held at the University of Sussex, in November 2019; and (iii) The Nature of Epistemic Normativity, held on Zoom in May 2021. Two additional conferences had been planned, but were canceled due to the pandemic: (iv) Reasoning and the Normativity of Logic, which was to be held at Stockholm University in 2020 and (v) Normativity and the Mental which was to be held at Jindal Global University in New Delhi in 2021.
3 Three Most Important Results
First, Besson wrote a complete draft of (1). (1) was both informed by the project and helped inform it, especially concerning answers (a), (b) and (e). Indeed Besson’s key aim is to defend logical cognitivism against its rivals, which are often motivated by Carroll’s Regress. She argues that the Regress is no threat to realist, cognitivist views concerning logic whereby we can have (propositional) knowledge of (robust) logical facts. She argues that alternatives rest on mistaken views concerning the epistemology and normativity of logic and more broadly concerning how epistemology and normativity interact.
Secondly, Hattiangadi, in addressing answers (a) (b) and (d), worked on the semantics of epistemic norms, focusing largely on forms of disagreement - such as logical, epistemic or normative disagreement more generally. This work has resulted in both the development of a powerful line of objection against relativism and expressivism about epistemic disagreement, as well as a positive account of the subject matter of such disagreements that is compatible with a robust realism about epistemic norms. This work has significant implications for the currently hotly debated topic of conceptual engineering and conceptual ethics, as well as for comprehensive disagreements in general, such as disagreements over climate change or evolution.
Finally, in relation to answers (a) and (b), both Besson and Hattiagandi now think that the extremely popular view that reasoning necessarily involves rule-following has to be rejected. They are working on a co-authored paper arguing for this claim in (24), which is currently in progress and was presented at CUNY in October 2021.
4 New Questions
One issue that has come into focus is the interaction between logical and epistemic norms. What our research reveals is that an adequate account of the normativity of epistemology must include an account of the normativity of logic, as well as an account of the relation between the two domains. Though logical norms were a part of the subject matter of the original application, the research that was conducted on logical normativity raised the following new questions: (i) Is logic normative? (ii) What is the relation between logical normativity and epistemic normativity? (iii) What is the correct account of logical disagreement, epistemic disagreement, and normative disagreement more generally? (iv) What is the relevance of debates between internalists and externalists about justification, in particular over deontological conceptions of justification, to the epistemology and normativity of logic? (v) Does deductive reasoning require rule-following? (vi) How can we develop a theory of normativity in the epistemic and logical domain that is properly reflected or integrated at the psychological level? (vii) Is knowing how normative and how does answering this question relate to the question whether knowing that is normative? (viii) What is the role of epistemic norms in the determination of content?
5 International Dimensions
The project hada large number of international affiliates who participated in the workshops that were organized by the project. These affiliates are listed on the project website.
In addition, we have relied on the Southern Normativity Group, of which Besson is a member. We have conducted several research visits: Packalén was a Visiting Scholar at Rutgers University; Hattiangadi was Taylor Fellow at The University of Otago and Visiting Fellow at the Philosophy Department at the Australian National University, Canberra. Besson had planned an extended visit to Sweden, which was canceled due to the pandemic.
6 Dissemination & Outreach
Project results have been disseminated at international conferences and through invited lectures worldwide. Besson has presented her results at the Arché Epistemology Group at the University of St Andrews; the Aristotelian Society, London; Logos, Barcelona: Saul Kripke Center, CUNY; the Vienna Forum for Analytic Philosophy Graduate Conference; Ludwig Maximilian Universität, Munich; University College, London; Bristol University; Glasgow University; Stockholm University; Stanford University; Cardiff University; the Norms and Reasons conference, Zürich; and the Logic, Norms, and Reasoning Colloquium, Cologne. Hattiangadi has presented her research at the Humboldt Normativity Workshop, Berlin; Umeå University, Stockholm University, Arché Research Center, St Andrews; Saul Kripke Center, CUNY; Frankfurt School of Finance and Management; Australian Association of Philosophy conference, Wollongong; The Arctic University of Norway; the University of Canterbury; Otago University; Oslo University; and the University of Tokyo.
We have engaged in significant outreach work in connection with the project. Besson has: participated in a public debate on ‘Beyond Right and Wrong’ organized by the Institute of Arts and Ideas (IAI); and spoken on ‘Norms, Evidence and Expertise’ at the EthicsLab Launch Week held at the Catholic University of Central Africa, Yaoundé, Cameroon. Dr Hattiangadi has: delivered a public lecture on ‘The Epistemology of Fake News’ at Jindal Global University in New Delhi; given a public lecture course on ‘The Epistemology of Fake News’ organized by IAI; participated in public debates on ‘Belief, Hypocrisy and Reason’, and ‘A Matter of Facts’ organized by IAI; published ‘Is this real life, or The Matrix?’ in IAI News; and filmed a podcast special, on ‘What is thought? Why do we think? How can we think well?’ for Dagens Nyheter.
Epistemologists investigate norms of rationality and reasoning (how one ought to reason), as well as standards of justification (what one is permitted to believe given one’s evidence). They investigate fundamental epistemic values, such as knowledge and truth, and seek to articulate epistemic virtues, such as responsiveness to evidence. In everyday life, we make epistemological claims, such as that we ought to believe in anthropogenic climate change, that this belief is justified given the evidence and that climate-change skepticism is not rationally permitted. All this suggests that epistemology is normative—it has to do with norms, standards, obligations and permissions. This raises questions about the semantics, metaphysics and epistemology of epistemic norms.
The overarching aim of this project has been to address the following questions: Do epistemological statements represent how things are? Are there objective, epistemological facts? If there are, can we come to know them? In answering these questions, we have defended Robust Realism about epistemology. With regard to language and mind, we have argued that (a) epistemological statements are representational, (b) epistemological judgments are belief-like, and (c) some are true substantively and absolutely. With regard to metaphysics, we have argued that (d) there are objective epistemological properties and facts. And with regard to epistemology, we have argued that (e) it is possible to know these facts. The project has developed a new focus on these issues as they relate to logical norms.
2 Implementation
Joint work was undertaken concerning the epistemology and normativity of reasoning. This work relates to the psychological question of whether epistemic judgments are belief-like (i.e. answers (a) and (b)) and the epistemological question of how we know epistemic norms (i.e. answer (e). The second concerns issues to do with the knowledge norm of assertion.
Besson’s individual research focused on two issues to do with answers (a) and (b): first, that of offering a new account of the epistemology and normativity of logic, which is cognitivist. This is done through the following works: (1) (3), (6), (7) and (8). In particular, she argues in (1) and (7) that deductive reasoning is not rule following and that a proper epistemology for logic has to be ‘particular first’ and not based on grasp of general logical rules; she also explores the ramifications of this view for the normativity and psychology of deductive reasoning. The second issue concerns giving an account of knowing how, which in her view is a clear case of how epistemology ties in with norms, as she argues in (4); and in (5), she looks at the way knowing how can be used to articulate the nature of logical knowledge and the action-guiding character of logic.
Hattiangadi’s individual work has focussed on two issues to do with answers (a), (c) and (d): the first concerns (a) and (c). (19) contains a critical discussion of relativist and expressivist accounts of the semantics of logical disagreement; (13) contains a critical review of existing accounts and puts forward a positive view that is compatible with robust realism about logic. The latter is also developed in relation to normative disagreement more generally (26). The second concerns (d): (13) investigates the nature of epistemic normativity, and the implications for metaethics; (12) puts forth an argument against naturalism about epistemic and semantic norms that does not rely on the assumption that these norms are categorically prescriptive; and (15) defends the view that logic is not normative for reasoning.
Three conferences were organized: (i) Normativity and the A priori, held at Stockholm University in August 2018; (ii) Post Truth and the Objectivity of Epistemic Norms, held at the University of Sussex, in November 2019; and (iii) The Nature of Epistemic Normativity, held on Zoom in May 2021. Two additional conferences had been planned, but were canceled due to the pandemic: (iv) Reasoning and the Normativity of Logic, which was to be held at Stockholm University in 2020 and (v) Normativity and the Mental which was to be held at Jindal Global University in New Delhi in 2021.
3 Three Most Important Results
First, Besson wrote a complete draft of (1). (1) was both informed by the project and helped inform it, especially concerning answers (a), (b) and (e). Indeed Besson’s key aim is to defend logical cognitivism against its rivals, which are often motivated by Carroll’s Regress. She argues that the Regress is no threat to realist, cognitivist views concerning logic whereby we can have (propositional) knowledge of (robust) logical facts. She argues that alternatives rest on mistaken views concerning the epistemology and normativity of logic and more broadly concerning how epistemology and normativity interact.
Secondly, Hattiangadi, in addressing answers (a) (b) and (d), worked on the semantics of epistemic norms, focusing largely on forms of disagreement - such as logical, epistemic or normative disagreement more generally. This work has resulted in both the development of a powerful line of objection against relativism and expressivism about epistemic disagreement, as well as a positive account of the subject matter of such disagreements that is compatible with a robust realism about epistemic norms. This work has significant implications for the currently hotly debated topic of conceptual engineering and conceptual ethics, as well as for comprehensive disagreements in general, such as disagreements over climate change or evolution.
Finally, in relation to answers (a) and (b), both Besson and Hattiagandi now think that the extremely popular view that reasoning necessarily involves rule-following has to be rejected. They are working on a co-authored paper arguing for this claim in (24), which is currently in progress and was presented at CUNY in October 2021.
4 New Questions
One issue that has come into focus is the interaction between logical and epistemic norms. What our research reveals is that an adequate account of the normativity of epistemology must include an account of the normativity of logic, as well as an account of the relation between the two domains. Though logical norms were a part of the subject matter of the original application, the research that was conducted on logical normativity raised the following new questions: (i) Is logic normative? (ii) What is the relation between logical normativity and epistemic normativity? (iii) What is the correct account of logical disagreement, epistemic disagreement, and normative disagreement more generally? (iv) What is the relevance of debates between internalists and externalists about justification, in particular over deontological conceptions of justification, to the epistemology and normativity of logic? (v) Does deductive reasoning require rule-following? (vi) How can we develop a theory of normativity in the epistemic and logical domain that is properly reflected or integrated at the psychological level? (vii) Is knowing how normative and how does answering this question relate to the question whether knowing that is normative? (viii) What is the role of epistemic norms in the determination of content?
5 International Dimensions
The project hada large number of international affiliates who participated in the workshops that were organized by the project. These affiliates are listed on the project website.
In addition, we have relied on the Southern Normativity Group, of which Besson is a member. We have conducted several research visits: Packalén was a Visiting Scholar at Rutgers University; Hattiangadi was Taylor Fellow at The University of Otago and Visiting Fellow at the Philosophy Department at the Australian National University, Canberra. Besson had planned an extended visit to Sweden, which was canceled due to the pandemic.
6 Dissemination & Outreach
Project results have been disseminated at international conferences and through invited lectures worldwide. Besson has presented her results at the Arché Epistemology Group at the University of St Andrews; the Aristotelian Society, London; Logos, Barcelona: Saul Kripke Center, CUNY; the Vienna Forum for Analytic Philosophy Graduate Conference; Ludwig Maximilian Universität, Munich; University College, London; Bristol University; Glasgow University; Stockholm University; Stanford University; Cardiff University; the Norms and Reasons conference, Zürich; and the Logic, Norms, and Reasoning Colloquium, Cologne. Hattiangadi has presented her research at the Humboldt Normativity Workshop, Berlin; Umeå University, Stockholm University, Arché Research Center, St Andrews; Saul Kripke Center, CUNY; Frankfurt School of Finance and Management; Australian Association of Philosophy conference, Wollongong; The Arctic University of Norway; the University of Canterbury; Otago University; Oslo University; and the University of Tokyo.
We have engaged in significant outreach work in connection with the project. Besson has: participated in a public debate on ‘Beyond Right and Wrong’ organized by the Institute of Arts and Ideas (IAI); and spoken on ‘Norms, Evidence and Expertise’ at the EthicsLab Launch Week held at the Catholic University of Central Africa, Yaoundé, Cameroon. Dr Hattiangadi has: delivered a public lecture on ‘The Epistemology of Fake News’ at Jindal Global University in New Delhi; given a public lecture course on ‘The Epistemology of Fake News’ organized by IAI; participated in public debates on ‘Belief, Hypocrisy and Reason’, and ‘A Matter of Facts’ organized by IAI; published ‘Is this real life, or The Matrix?’ in IAI News; and filmed a podcast special, on ‘What is thought? Why do we think? How can we think well?’ for Dagens Nyheter.